



THE UNIVERSITY OF  
**NEWCASTLE**  
AUSTRALIA

# Using Heart Rate Measurements to Understand and Support Decision Making in Electronic Auctions

Marc Adam

| Marc T. P. Adam | Applied Information Research Group |



# Emotions in Electronic Commerce

## Excitement



Users' experienced emotional intensity and derived hedonic value from shopping

## Social Presence



Users' perception of social embeddedness and interaction with another human being

## Time Pressure



Users' perception of time restrictions imposed on them when making a decision

## Auction Fever



Intense emotional state experienced by bidders who bid over pre-set price limits

# Auction Platforms

## Madbid.com

Created for Fun Shopping

Excitement

Price

Time Pressure

Kindle Fire HD

Like 0 +1 0 Tweet 0 Pin it Share

£3.07 00:00:08 madmax\_de

BID

BuyNow Unavailable

Auction Information Bidding History Delivery Information

Bidder	Amount
madmax_de	£3.07
sniper0	£3.06
madmax_de	£3.05
sniper0	£3.04
CatherineH11	£3.03
madmax_de	£3.02

4 x ☆

# Focus of Investigation: Auction Fever

## Auction Fever

Bidders' "adrenaline starts to rush, their emotions block their ability to think clearly, and they end up bidding more than they ever envisioned" (Murnighan, 2002, p. 63)



## Selected Literature on Auction Fever

- Internet auctions often yield **higher prices** than fixed-price offers (Jones, 2011)
- Rivalry, social facilitation, and time pressure increase „competitive **arousal**“ and bidding (Ku et al., 2005)
- Time pressure induces **aggressive** bidding behavior in ascending auctions (Haruvy & Popkowski Leszczyc, 2009)

## Alternative Explanations

- Search costs (Carare & Rothkopf, 2005)
- Winner's curse (Kagel & Levin, 1986)
- Bidder's curse (Lee & Malmendier, 2011)
- Winner regret & loser regret (Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Katok, 2011)
- Quasi-/pseudo-endowment (Heyman et al., 2004)

**Approach: Investigate the auction fever phenomenon in a controlled laboratory experiment with physiological measurements.**

# Agenda


(1) An Experiment on Auction Fever

(2) Feature Selection

(3) Different Auction Paradigms

(4) Decision Support

# Research Model



(Adam et al., 2015, *Journal of Retailing*)

# Laboratory Environment

After the end of the auction, the resale value will be drawn randomly from the interval [46; 95].

## Auction

Current Price: 57 MU

Exit Auction



# Experimental Design


		Time Pressure	
		Low time pressure [time interval $\tau = 5.0$ s]	High time pressure [time interval $\tau = 0.5$ s]
Social Competition	Human competitors	HUM_LTP (72 subjects)	HUM_HTP (72 subjects)
	Computer competitors	COM_LTP (48 subjects)	COM_HTP (48 subjects)

## Setting

- ascending clock auctions
- 3 bidders per auction
- initial price = 25 MU (1 MU = 0.20 €)
- increment = 1 MU per time interval
- 15 rounds/auctions (1 practice round)
- 6 subjects per session
- 240 subjects in 40 sessions
- between-subjects design
- random stranger matching
- initial 5 minute resting period



## Time Pressure, Social Competition, and Arousal




→ Bidders experience more arousal in auctions with high time pressure

→ Bidders experience less arousal in auctions with computer competitors

HTP = High Time Pressure  
LTP = Low Time Pressure  
θHR = Normalized Heart Rate

## Time Pressure and Bidding Behavior




→ Bidders place higher bids in ascending clock auctions with high time pressure

→ Computer competitors mitigate the effect of time pressure on bids

HTP = High Time Pressure  
LTP = Low Time Pressure  
MU = Monetary Units



## Emotions in Response to Auction Outcome



→ Joy of winning is stronger than frustration of losing in ascending clock auctions

→ Time pressure and human competitors mitigate the intensity of immediate emotions in response to the auction outcome.

→ Ascending auctions have the potential to convey a more rewarding experience than descending auctions (e.g., Dutch auctions).

HTP = High Time Pressure  
LTP = Low Time Pressure  
HUM = Human Competitors  
COM = Computer Competitors  
SCR = Skin Conductance Response

# Study 2 – Avatars & Social Competition

The resale value is drawn from a discrete uniform distribution on the interval {110 MU, 155 MU}.

**auction**

current price: 90 MU

5

place bid    exit

bidders:

- star\_bidder (YOU)
- victory\_flash
- turbo\_pirate

Detailed description: This screenshot shows an auction interface. At the top, a text box states: "The resale value is drawn from a discrete uniform distribution on the interval {110 MU, 155 MU}." Below this, the word "auction" is centered. A box displays "current price: 90 MU". A red-bordered box contains the number "5". At the bottom left are two buttons: "place bid" and "exit". On the right, a "bidders:" list shows three entries: "star\_bidder (YOU)" with a blue star icon, "victory\_flash" with a green flame icon, and "turbo\_pirate" with a red pirate icon.

The resale value is drawn from a discrete uniform distribution on the interval {110 MU, 155 MU}.

**auction**




current price: 90 MU

5

place bid    exit

Detailed description: This screenshot shows an auction interface, identical in layout to the first one. It features the same text box at the top: "The resale value is drawn from a discrete uniform distribution on the interval {110 MU, 155 MU}." Below it, the word "auction" is centered. A box displays "current price: 90 MU". A red-bordered box contains the number "5". At the bottom left are two buttons: "place bid" and "exit". In this version, the "bidders:" list is absent, leaving only the "star\_bidder (YOU)" bidder.

# Study 2 – Avatars & Social Competition



# Agenda


(1) An Experiment on Auction Fever

(2) Feature Selection

(3) Different Auction Paradigms

(4) Decision Support

# Physiological Measures (Candidate Features)



→ Total combinations: 5772 (Candidate Features)


→ Much more possible model inputs than observations




# Approach – Evolutionary Algorithm

## **Non-Dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm II (NSGA-II)**

[Deb et al. 2002]


- Evolutionary-based metaheuristic
- Minimizes objectives based on their fitness values
  - $R^2$  is supposed to be maximized  $\rightarrow$  minimize  $R^2 * (-1)$
- Does not calculate a single solution but a *Pareto Front*
- Orders individuals based on their *Rank*
  - $\forall i \in \{1.. \beta\}: f_i(a) \leq f_i(b)$
  - $\exists i \in \{1.. \beta\}: f_i(a) < f_i(b)$
- Starts with random initial population of 25 CFs (max. 50 CFs) per individual
- Existing  MATLAB implementation




# Approach – Robustness

Due to the stochastic nature of the Evolutionary Algorithm, the robustness of the results needs to be backed by:


- **Multiple Runs**
  - 100-times for each prediction model
- **Splitting the Dataset**
  - Use Training, Validation, and Test data
- **Cross Validation**
  - Use 10-Fold Cross Validation at each iteration
- **No single result**
  - Use sum of all results



# Results – Measures



# Results – Windows & Offsets



# Agenda


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
(3) Different Auction Paradigms

(4) Decision Support

Adam, Krämer, Weinhardt (2012-13). "Excitement up! Price down! Measuring emotions in Dutch auctions," *International Journal of Electronic Commerce*, 17(2), 7–39.



Clock speed / Value model	Fast (2.0 MU / sec)	Slow (0.2 MU / sec)
Common value (CV)	CV_fast (24 subjects)	CV_slow (24 subjects)
Independent private value (IPV)	IPV_fast (24 subjects)	IPV_slow (24 subjects)






→ Clock speed induces excitement

→ Excitement mediates impact on prices

→ Clock speed mitigates immediate emotions

→ Frustration of losing stronger than joy

Teubner, Adam, Riordan (in press). "The impact of computerized agents on arousal and bidding behavior in electronic auctions," *Journal of the Association for Information Systems*.



→ Arousal is correlated with bids in FPSB auctions when the bidders compete with human opponents.

→ Stronger immediate emotions in FPSB auctions when competing with human opponents.

→ Higher arousal in FPSB auctions when competing with human opponents

- first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auctions
- human or computer opponents
- independent private values {11, ..., 110}

# Agenda

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
(4) Decision Support



# Emotion Regulation & Biofeedback

## Consideration

- Arousal can have **detrimental** effects on decision making
- Being aware of arousal might help to **regulate emotions**



# Sample Trading Interface

Period 1/3
Trading
Elapsed Time: 01:29


You are an informed trader.

### Order Book

Buy Orders [MU]	Sell Orders [MU]
X 38	40
X 36	41
X 36	41
X 34	41
X 33	41
X 33	41
X 33	41
X 33	41
X 31	41
X 27	41
X 21	41
X 21	41

You sold one security.

### Live Biofeedback



### Order Submission

Buy 1
Dividend Interval:  
[21;41] MU
Sell 1

Buy Order

Sell Order

Time Remaining

# 31

Seconds

### Additional Information

Apart from you, there are 11 other market participants. Of these 1 are participants in this room and 10 are computer agents.

	BUYS	SELLS
Targets	-	-
MY # Shares	0	2
MY Avg Price	0	38
MKT Avg Price	39	41
MKT # Shares	65	23


### Your Last Trades

Time	Price	Direction	Change
69	41	sell	0
66	41	sell	+3
57	38	sell	-3
54	41	sell	+2
54	39	sell	-2
48	41	sell	0

### Your Holdings

Cash	Shares
897	-22

### Trading History



Time	Price
86	39
84	38
82	40
82	39
82	39
80	40
79	39
77	40
74	40
73	39
71	40
71	41
70	41
69	41
68	39
67	39
66	41
66	40

# Emotion Regulation & Biofeedback

## Integrating Live Biofeedback into Information Systems

- Providing users with **live biofeedback** on their arousal level supports self-monitoring the emotional state
- Use **serious games** with real-time biofeedback to provide users with an engaging learning environment
- With the serious game effective **emotion regulation** can be actively practiced and rewarded.



## Application in Electronic Auctions


- Provide market participants with live biofeedback
- Train emotion regulation to investigate whether the impact of arousal on behavior can be actively regulated



*“sound and rational decision making, in fact, depends on prior accurate emotional processing” (Bechara & Damasio, 2005)*

(Astor, Adam, Jerčić, Schaaff, Weinhardt, 2013, JMIS)

Astor, Adam, Jerčić, Schaaff, Weinhardt (2013). "Integrating biosignals into information systems: A NeuroIS tool for improving emotion regulation" *Journal of Management Information Systems*.



**Design Guideline 1:** Choose measurements which are adequate for the environment of the users; e.g., use ECG recording with dry electrodes and wireless data transmission for providing users in fast-paced environments with live biofeedback in an unobtrusive way.

**Design Guideline 2:** Present biofeedback in an intuitive and meaningful way. Reduce complexity and use salient visual, auditory, or tactile cues (e.g., colors, arousal meter), while taking into account the contextual and situational circumstances of the users.

**Design Guideline 3:** Biofeedback is to some extent processed unconsciously; include objective measurements (e.g., eye tracking) during demonstration sessions in order to evaluate and iteratively re-design the way in which biofeedback is presented to users

**Design Guideline 4:** Use serious games with real-time biofeedback and arousing game elements in order to provide users with an engaging learning environment in which effective emotion regulation can be actively practiced and rewarded.

➔ Real-time biofeedback based serious game to improve emotion regulation.



**Thank you!**

Schaaff, Degen, Adler, Adam (2012). "Measuring affect using a standard mouse device", *Biomedical Engineering/ Biomedizinische Technik*, 57(Suppl. 1), 761–764.

